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human capital, is premised on the view that individual decision-making
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governs the relationship between longevity and education. This relation-
ship is revisited here from the perspective of optimal period school life ex-
pectancy, obtained from the utility maximization of the whole population
characterized by its age structure and its age-specific fertility and mortal-
ity. Realistic life tables such as model life tables are mandatory, because
the age distribution of mortality matters, notably at infant and juvenile
ages. Optimal period school life expectancy varies with life expectancy
and mortality. The application to French historical data from 1806 to
nowadays shows that the population age structure has indeed modified the
relationship between longevity and optimal schooling.
keywords: longevity, schooling, school life expectancy, age structure.
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1 Introduction
Ben-Porath (1967) suggested a “mechanism” according to which longer life
spans imply larger investment in human capital. This mechanism is central to
several new growth theories in the field of unified growth theory. For example,
Boucekkine et al. (2002, 2004) argued that early increases in life expectancy,
mediated by the Ben-Porath mechanism, are at the origin of modern growth:
longer lives would induce longer schooling and higher rates of human capital
accumulation, giving rise to a new growth regime which allows the escape from
the Malthusian trap.
French historical data are accurate enough to give us an insight into the
relationship between longevity and education, at the moment of both the school-
ing and the mortality transitions. From the accurate estimates of female life
expectancy at birth by French de´partements from 1806-10 to 1901-05 of Bon-
neuil (1997a) and from French schooling rates in 1837, 1850, 1867, and 1876
(Bonneuil, 2014), we regressed the time series of the growth rate of female life
expectancy (tested to be stationary) on the growth rate of the female schooling
rate (also tested to be stationary) in 1837-50, 1850-67, and 1867-76. On 82 French
de´partements, these regressions yield 11 positive correlations (for de´partements
located erratically on the territory), 6 negative, and 65 non significant. Then, in
spite of the scarcity in time, the absence of clear correlation raises doubts that
the relationship between longevity and schooling would be unequivocal.
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In a quantity-quality trade-off model a` la Becker (1991), Hazan and Zoabi
(2006) show that the Ben-Porath mechanism may not always work because an
increase in longevity affects not only the return to schooling (quality of children),
but also the return to quantity or the optimal total number of children. The
latter effect mitigates the Ben Porath mechanism and can in principle negate it.
Under homothetic preferences, Hazan and Zoabi (2006) find that when fertility
is endogenous, an exogenous increase in children’s longevity has no effect on
schooling. Hazan (2010) questions the Ben-Porath mechanism explicitly. He
starts from the cohort model of Boucekkine et al. (2002): all individuals of
all cohorts are identical and make decisions about their lifetime consumption,
schooling, and work time. Attending school for a longer time has a cost in terms
of foregone labor income but this schooling time also induces a gain because
longer schooling means higher wages in the labor market. In the case of a perfectly
rectangular survival function, increased longer longevity leads to longer schooling
only if the total expected number of hours spent at work during one’s lifetime
also rises. Hazan (2010) tested this property on US data for consecutive 10-year
cohorts born between 1840 and 1970, to find that the total number of hours
worked did not increase, and to conclude that the Ben-Porath mechanism was
not relevant for the US during this period. Cervellati and Sunde (2009), however,
argued that the connection between the total number of hours spent at work
during an individual’s lifetime and the Ben-Porath mechanism does not hold for
non-perfectly rectangular survival functions.
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All the studies referred to so far are based on individual decision-making
where agents decide about their optimal consumption stream and their lifetime
accumulation of human capital over lifetime for a given ad-hoc survival func-
tion. Hazan (2010) and Cervellati and Sunde (2009) used a continuous time
(homogeneous) cohort model, incorporating a schooling time decision model like
in Boucekkine et al. (2002). Cervelatti and Sunde (2013) illustrated their argu-
ment on a discrete-time version of their cohort model. Boucekkine et al. (2007)
introduced within-cohort heterogeneity into this model, which adds formidable
complications. However, decisions relative to education are not individual; on the
contrary, at least in continental Europe, education is run mainly by the State.
For example, control over education in France dates back at least to 1837, when
the government started to invest substantial human and material resources in
schooling. It withdrew university degrees from private education in 1880, made
primary schooling free in 1881, and education became non-clerical and manda-
tory in 1882. The State finances schools and teachers, with individuals who send
their children to state-run schools, which constitute the large majority of teach-
ing establishments, having practically nothing to pay. State schools have been
organized in this way until now in most European countries. Nineteenth century
France offers an exemplary case, and Ben Porath’s hypothesis that governments
would respond to increasing longevity by lengthening schooling time can be tested
in the context of a rapidly changing demography and deliberate State policies to
increase schooling time for boys and girls.
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We innovate by relying on the alternative criterion of optimal period schooling,
which is the only one so far to involve the whole age structure, in contrast to
individual follow-up. The State’s expenditures depend on the ratio of schooled
children to tax-payers, and this ratio is a function of the age structure. For an
equivalent mortality level and population size, at each date, a population in a low
fertility regime has comparatively more contributors and fewer schooled children
than a population in a higher fertility regime.
A basic formulation of the optimal period schooling equivalent could be the
following: given the age structure of the population, its current fertility and
mortality levels, would a planner seeking to maximize social welfare (say with
respect to the Benthamite criterion) lengthen schooling in response to rising life
expectancy? In contrast to the individual-cohort perspective adopted in the
related literature, the key component of the period schooling optimum problem
is that the decisions have to be taken on the basis of the overall demographic
structure. Therefore, the current age structure of the population determines
schooling decisions, whereas it is ignored in the literature on individual schooling
decisions. Put simply, the main reason supporting the argument that longer life
implies longer education is that the proportion of people above the maximum
school completion age increases as mortality decreases. But this holds true only
if the proportion of people under that age does not increase faster. Following a
cohort, as did Hazan (2010) or Cervellati and Sunde (2009, 2013), is equivalent
to fixing fertility at a constant value over time. The conditions of the moment
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however vary with fertility, so that if the proportion of people in school increases,
compared to the proportion out of school, greater longevity may not be enough
to offset higher fertility, leading to a decrease in schooling, at the optimum. The
relationship between length of life and schooling will thus depend on the balance
between the additional young from higher fertility and the additional old from
improved survival.
We shall then work with the concept of the fictitious cohort,1 where the forces
of change affecting people of successive ages living at the same time are applied to
a fictitious group of people born at a same time and who would experience these
age-specific forces successively as they age. A fictitious cohort built for each date
and its associated stable population for this date will yield the conditions of the
moment at that date. The tool of fictitious cohort is common in mathematical
demography (Bonneuil, 1997b). The associated concept to the fictitious cohort
is “school life expectancy”, which is defined as “the total number of years of
schooling (primary to tertiary) that a child can expect to receive, assuming that
the probability of his or her being enrolled in school at any particular future
1A fictitious cohort over the period, say, [t, t + 1) consists of, say, 100 people, born during
this period and experiencing over their lifetimes the mortality schedule prevailing in this period.
Its attrition over age characterizes the mortality conditions of the moment [t, t+ 1). This is the
basis for computing the widely used period life expectancy, which is the expected age at death
of the fictitious cohort, and the total fertility rate, which is the no less widely used expected
total number of children born to a woman of the fictitious cohort during her entire life if she
were exposed to the fertility conditions of the moment [t, t+ 1).
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age is equal to the current enrollment ratio at that age.”2 The period school life
expectancy is then the sum over all ages of the probabilities at a given date to
remain in school.
The conditions of the moment consist in the expected age of the oldest
schooled individual at time t, the consumption schedule by age at t, the leisure
schedule by age at t, the fertility schedule by age at t, and the life table at t.
To make decisions, social planners use their knowledge of these conditions of the
moment, not their knowledge of the stocks of population or of the school expe-
rience of each cohort present at t. In demography, family policies are based on
period fertility rates, whose sum is the total fertility rate. This rate is used to
define population policies, no matter the total number of children born to each
cohort of women at time t. Similarly, period life expectancy summarizes the
mortality rates of the moment in a fictitious cohort, and insurance policies are
decided on the basis of period life expectancy, not of cohort life expectancies. So-
cial planners cannot modify past variables and are aware that, if the conditions
at date t were maintained for long enough, the population would converge to
the stable population associated with the fertility schedule and the life table at t
(“ergodicity” theorem (Cohen, 1979)). The decisions of social planners are based
not on the mortality, fertility, educational, consumption, and income histories of
each cohort, but on current conditions, which are measured through age-specific
mortality, fertility, and schooling rates and through consumption and age-specific
2https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2205.html
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income prevailing at the current period.
We shall study the optimal schooling rule adopted by a social planner and
see how this rule responds to increased longer longevity. For the sake of clarity,
we shall assume that the planner fixes the income transfer rates from working
to non-working ages (people at school and pensioners) in such a way that the
budget is never in deficit. Allowing the planner to borrow (subject to a no-Ponzi
game condition) complicates the technicalities, but handling the age structure
is already onerous (leading to nonlinear functional integral equations). So, we
impose zero deficit at any date. By doing so, we offer a symmetrical setting to
the one adopted in the cohort-individual literature. In the latter, the individual
(representing the fictitious cohort) is followed-up over his/her lifetime (inter-
temporal optimization). We focus on the demand side, with emphasis on the
population age structure, to identify the cases where this mechanism fails to be
optimal, even when education supply is not at stake.
In Section 2, we derive optimal period schooling from conditions of the mo-
ment through a maximization program to be solved by the social planner. In
Section 3, we show how the period optimal schooling is modified when life ex-
pectancy or fertility are varied. We shall specify the model with realistic model
life tables, and, in Appendix, present analytical yet unrealistic cases (constant,
linear, and Gompertz mortality). We shall situate empirical cases of French
de´partements in the space defined by fertility, life expectancy, and schooling. We
shall draw the trajectory of France as a whole in this space and discuss optimal
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schooling with demographically realistic assumptions. Our main result is that
the relationship between longevity and schooling is mediated by infant mortality
and by fertility, so that Ben Porath’s claim that longer life is positively associ-
ated with longer schooling holds true only in countries with low mortality and
low fertility. The contrary holds true in countries before or at the onset of the
demographic transition.
2 Period optimal schooling, through the ficti-
tious cohort
Instead of tracking individuals’ life-cycle decisions as in Ben Porath’s frame-
work, we consider an alternative setting where schooling decisions are taken by
a government which optimizes social welfare at each date. Its program is:
maxc(t,.),l(t,.),AS(t) V (t) =
∫ A¯
0 p(t, a)u(c(t, a), `(t, a)) da, ∀t, (1)
where AS(t) is the age of the oldest schooled individual, A¯ is the maximal life
span, and where, at age a and time t, p(t, a) represents the total number of people
and c(t, a) consumption per head; each individual of age a has one unit of time
available, shared between `(t, a) in leisure and 1−`(t, a) in labor supply for active
people or in time spent in school for schooled children, and u is the continuously
differentiable strictly concave utility function, assumed additively separable in
consumption and leisure.
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The budget constraint of the government at date t is:
∫ A¯
0
p(t, a)c(t, a) da =
∫ AR
AS(t)
(1− `(t, a))p(t, a)w(t, a) da, (2)
where w(t, a) denotes wages at age a and time t. Equation (2) equalizes total
consumption of individuals at every age at date t with labor income earned by
all active individuals at t. The age at retirement AR is not a control variable, but
taken here as constant for the sake of simplicity, because we focus on schooling.
Problem {1, 2} is age-structured, in contrast to models of Ben Porath’s mech-
anism based on individual follow-up. One may question the fact that the govern-
ment’s objective function is not inter-temporal. First, governments have short-
term horizons often limited by the electoral cycle. Second, by maximizing at each
date, we isolate the pure effect of the age structure, whereas individual follow-up
isolates pure life cycle effects and misses collective disparity. Third, planners
wish to know what to decide from the conditions of the moment: they are free
to repeat this exercise with projected demographic forces into the future, and
then, at each future date, to adapt policies to the projected conditions of the
moment (this is exactly what is done with fertility and mortality). And the age
structure associated with the demographic forces of the moment are obtained by
the ergodicity theorem (Cohen, 1979).
Using the concept of fictitious cohort, we define the school life expectancy as:
S(t) :=
∫ AS(t)
0
(1− `(t, b)) db. (3)
It corresponds to no actual cohort, but to a fictitious one, which at age b would
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have spent (1−`(t, b)) time units in school. It measures the conditions of schooling
of the moment t. In contrast to the literature focusing on individual schooling
decisions, the schooling variable S(t) measures aggregate time at school spent
by all individuals aged between 0 and AS(t) at time t. In practice, it is the
total time spent in primary, secondary, and tertiary education at a given period
(e.g. Done, 2012). AS(t) is a control variable, whereby the planner decides
at which age individuals can no longer remain in school. Schooling starts at
t = 0 by construction. In practice, governments may set the age for entry into
schooling and the age for exit. We consider only the latter, following the literature
developing Ben Porath’s hypothesis.
We specify wages to depend on the school period life expectancy, as:
w(t, a) = ι(a) exp(θ(S(t)), (4)
where ι describes a schedule of wages across age, after controlling for date. We
assume that for given total schooling S, productivity at work is an increasing
function of S, say exp(θ(S)), where θ(.) is an increasing and concave production
function. This follows the specification in the literature around Ben Porath with
individual maximization. Wages at age a and time t depend on the age profile ι
and on school life expectancy S(t) in a multiplicative and separable way, for the
sake of tractability. Equation (4) implies that a higher school life expectancy S(t)
increases wages at date t for all ages. There is no empirical evidence to support
this claim, but it may hold true anyhow: for example, Done (2012) reports that,
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in sub-Saharan Africa, school life expectancy is 9 years of age with low wages
across all ages while in the Western world, schooling life expectancy is 16 years
of age with much higher wages at each age.
We now solve the program. State variables are the age-specific population
p(t, a) and the total schooling time S(t); control variables are consumption c(t, a),
leisure `(t, a), and the age AS(t) of the oldest schooled individual.
The Lagrangian is built from (1) and (2), after replacing with the right-hand
side of (4). The first-order condition obtained by differentiating with respect to
consumption c is:
u′c(c(t, a), `(t, a)) = λ, ∀a. (5)
The first-order conditions obtained by differentiating with respect to `(t, a):
for a > AS(t) u
′
`(c(t, a), `(t, a)) = λe
θ(S(t))ι(a)
for a ≤ AS(t) p(t, a)u′`(c(t, a), `(t, a)) = λ
∫ AR
AS(t)
p(t, b)(1− `(t, b))eθ(S(t))θ′(S(t))ι(b) db.
(6)
The first-order conditions obtained by differentiating with respect to AS(t) yields
the relationship between schooling time and population:
1
θ′(S(t)) =
∫ AR
AS(t)
p(t,a)
p(t,AS(t))
(1− `(t, a)) ι(a)
ι(AS(t))
da. (7)
Equation (7) is also:
∫ AR
AS(t)
p(t, a)(1− `(t, a))ι(a)θ′(S(t)) da = ι(AS(t)) p(t, AS(t)), (8)
13
or, for the sake of economic interpretation:
∫ AR
AS(t)
p(t, a)(1− `(t, a))ι(a)(1− `(t, AS(t)))eθ(S(t))θ′(S(t)) da =
(1− `(t, AS(t)))eθ(S(t))ι(AS(t)) p(t, AS(t)),
(9)
where the left-hand side is the marginal benefit from increasing AS(t), which
depends on the curvature of the return function through S(t) and on the age
structure of the active population. The right-hand side is the marginal social
loss, which consists of the income forgone by postponing entry into the labor
market until age a = AS(t). In contrast to the formulas derived in Boucekkine
et al. (2002), here the schooling decision depends on the age-structure.
Equation (7) is the counterpart of Equation (9) of Cervellati and Sunde (2009:
5) associated with the individual-based life-cycle model of the Ben Porath mech-
anism. Notably, the age class size p(t, a) at time t and age a has replaced the
unconditional probability for an individual of surviving to age a. These authors
followed an individual, assimilated to a cohort, and used cohort school life ex-
pectancy (but there is a single cohort) as control variable. By construction, they
did not deal with population, but only with survival of the cohort along with
age. The decisive difference with us is that (7) involves not only survival, but
age pyramids, which mix survival and fertility.
We now combine fertility and mortality of the moment. This operation re-
sults in an age-structured population reflecting the combined conditions of the
moment. For this population associated with the fictitious cohort, fertility and
mortality are constant over time; their values are those taken at moment t. By
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definition, this population is stable.
3 Stable population associated with the condi-
tions of the year t
A stable population is a population closed to migration and characterized
by constant fertility and mortality. These forces determine the age structure.
Conversely, a stable age structure characterizes given fertility and mortality flows.
The stable population associated with the conditions of the moment t, namely
mortality µ(t, a) and fertility φ(t, a), has its population growth rate ρ(t) given by
the Lotka equation:
1 =
∫ A¯
0
σ(t, a)e−ρ(t)aφ(t, a) da , (10)
where σ(t, a) = 1 − exp(− ∫ a0 µ(t, u) du) is the period survival function at t. An
empirical population has no reason to be stable, but, following Lotka, at the
moment t, its forces of death (µ(t, a)) and its forces of life (φ(t, a)) are synthesized
in the intrinsic growth rate ρ(t) solution of (10). At each time t fixed, consider a
population of size P0(0) := P (t) endowed with a fertility schedule φ0(a) := φ(t, a)
for all ages a and a mortality distribution µ0(a) := µ(t, a). According to Lotka’s
equation, its growth rate is equal to the intrinsic growth rate ρ0 = ρ(t). This
population with constant fertility φ0(.) and mortality µ0(.) has an age pyramid
p0(τ, a) := P0(0)e
ρ0τ
σ0(a)e
−ρ0a∫ A¯
0 σ0(b)e
−ρ0b db
(11)
15
at time τ , where σ0(a) = exp(− ∫ a0 µ0(u) du, and a population size P0(τ) =
P0(0) exp(ρ0τ). The time τ runs from 0 to ∞ for each date t, so that the stable
population characterized by p0(τ, a) corresponds at time τ to the conditions of
the fixed moment t. The age structure
σ0(a)e
−ρ0a∫ A¯
0 σ0(b)e
−ρ0b db
(12)
is independent of the time τ .
We now replace the previous notation indexed by 0, which we introduced for
pedagogical reasons, by the notations φ(t, a), µ(t, a), σ(t, a), ρ(t), and P (t). At
time τ , the total number of people is
pt(τ, a) := P (t)e
ρ(t)τ σ(t, a)e
−ρ(t)a∫ A¯
0 σ(t, b)e
−ρ(t)b db
(13)
aged a in this stable population (e.g. Bonneuil, 1997) depends on the mortality
µ(t, a) and the population growth rate ρ(t), which themselves do not depend on
the kinematics inherent in the stable population and indexed by the time τ . We
leave the subscript t to pt(τ, a) to remind that the forces of death and fertility
are those at t, but that the associated stable population involves another time,
denoted by τ . The population size P (t) at time t is the initial population for the
kinematics of the associated stable population pt(τ, a), τ = t, · · ·.
By replacing pt(t, a) by its expression in Equation (13) for τ = t, Equation (7)
becomes:
1
θ′(S(t))
=
∫ AR
AS(t)
σ(t, b)
σ(t, AS(t))
(1− `(t, b)) ι(b)
ι(AS(t))
e−ρ(t)(b−AS(t)) db. (14)
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At constant fertility, if the life expectancy increases, µ(t, a) decreases for every
age a and e−
∫ b
a
µ(t,u) du increases, but ρ(t) also increases and e−ρ(t)(b−a) decreases.
So the two effects are in opposite directions.
In Equation (14), the term depending on period life expectancy e0(t) defined
as e0(t) :=
∫∞
0 aµ(t, a)σ(t, a) da =
∫∞
0 σ(t, a) da is
σ(t, b)
σ(t, AS(t))
e−ρ(t)(b−AS(t)) = e
−
∫ b
AS(t)
µ(t,a) da
e−ρ(t)(b−AS(t)), (15)
whose derivative is:
e
−
∫ b
AS(t)
µ(t,u) du
e−ρ(t)(b−AS(t))(−
∫ b
AS(t)
∂µ(t, u)
∂e0(t)
du− (b− AS(t)) ∂ρ(t)
∂e0(t)
) . (16)
The direction of the co-variation of longevity and schooling is given by the
sign of ∂S(t)/∂e0(t). Because
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
= − 1
θ,2(S(t))
∂θ′(S(t))
∂e0(t)
∂S(t)
∂e0(t)
, (17)
and thanks to the assumption that θ is increasing and concave (∂θ
′(S(t))
∂e0(t)
< 0),
∂S(t)/∂e0(t) = ∂(1/θ
′(S(t)))/∂e0(t).
The effect on 1
θ′(S(t)) of an increase in period life expectancy e0(t) on
1
θ′ depends
then on the sign of:
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
=
∫ AR
AS(t)
(1− `(t, b) ι(b)
ι(AS(t))
e
−
∫ b
AS(t)
µ(t,u) du
e−ρ(t)(b−AS(t))
(− ∫ bAS(t) ∂µ(t,u)∂e0(t) du− (b− AS(t)) ∂ρ(t)∂e0(t)) db .
(18)
or
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
=
∫ AR
AS(t)
(1− `(t, b))) ι(b)
ι(AS(t))
e
−
∫ b
AS(t)
µ(t,u) du
e−ρ(t)(b−AS(t))
(− ∫ bAS(t) ∂(ρ+µ(t,u))∂e0(t) du) db .
(19)
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From (10), we obtain ∂ρ(t)
∂e0(t)
from the Lotka equation:
∂ρ(t)
∂e0(t)
=
∫ A¯
0 (−
∫ a
0
∂µ(t,v)
∂e0(t)
dv)e−ρ(t)aσ(t, a)φ(t, a) da∫ A¯
0 ae
−ρ(t)aσ(t, a)φ(t, a) da
, (20)
which is positive, because ∂µ(e0(t),u)
∂e0(t)
< 0: empirical observation as well as mor-
tality models indicate that mortality decreases at all ages when life expectancy
increases.
Substituting ∂ρ(t)
∂e0(t)
into Equation (19) yields:
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
=
∫ AR
AS(t)
(1− `(t, b)) ι(b)
ι(AS(t))
e
−
∫ b
AS(t)
µ(t,u) du
e−ρ(t)(b−AS(t))
(− ∫ bAS(t)
∫ A¯
0
(−
∫ a
0
∂µ(t,v)
∂e0(t)
dv)e−ρ(t)aσ(t,a)φ(t,a) da+ ∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
∫ A¯
0
ae−ρ(t)aσ(t,a)φ(t,a) da∫ A¯
0
ae−ρ(t)aσ(t,a)φ(t,a) da
) du db
=
∫ AR
AS(t)
(1− `(t, b)) ι(b)
ι(AS(t))
e
−
∫ b
AS(t)
µ(t,u) du
e−ρ(t)(b−AS(t))
(− ∫ bAS(t)
∫ A¯
0
(
∫ a
0
(
∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
− ∂µ(t,v)
∂e0(t)
) dv)e−ρ(t)aσ(t,a)φ(t,a) da∫ A¯
0
ae−ρ(t)aσ(t,a)φ(t,a) da
) du db.
(21)
Marchand and The´lot (1991) explain that, until the nineteenth century, usual
daily work coincided with daylight, and that work hours had been remaining
the same, be it in town or in countryside, varying only with seasons. They do
not mention any age component, but their description is consistent with the fact
that age had no effect on the duration at work. OECD publishes incidences of
employment by usual weekly hours worked and by quinquennial age class only
from 2000 onwards.3 From these data, we computed the mean total number of
worked hours by age class: for France, this number was 36.5 (sd=0.3) for men
and women aged 20-24, 37.9 (sd=0.3) for the 25-29, 38.3 (sd=0.2) for the 30-34,
3http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AVE HRS&Lang=fr
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38.3 (sd=0.3) for the 35-39, the 40-44, and the 45-49 age classes. The proximity
of these numbers allows us to assume that the age profile of labor supply in one
individual’s day is constant with age, then:
∀b ∈ [AS(t), AR], 1− `(t, b) = 1− `(t, AS(t)) . (22)
Then
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
has the sign of:
f(e0(t), φ(t, .)) :=
∫ AR
AS(t)
ι(b)
ι(AS(t))
e
−
∫ b
AS(t)
µ(t,u) du
e−ρ(t)(b−AS(t))
(− ∫ bAS(t)
∫ A¯
0
(
∫ a
0
(
∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
− ∂µ(t,v)
∂e0(t)
) dv)e−ρ(t)aσ(t,a)φ(t,a) da∫ A¯
0
ae−ρ(t)aσ(t,a)φ(t,a) da
) du db,
(23)
where φ(t, .)) is the fertility pattern underlying the value of the population growth
rate ρ(t) with respect to Equation (10).
Figure 1 shows the value of ∂µ(t,a)
∂e0(t)
from Ledermann model life tables, which
are very realistic,4 contrary to analytical formulas, which at best capture only
certain age intervals (after 40 years for a Gompertz curve, for example). Figure 1
shows that infant ages, up to 4 years, are determinant in the computation of
∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
− ∂µ(t,v)
∂e0(t)
: with increasing life expectancy, this importance of infant ages
gradually vanishes, and the sign of
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
becomes more dependent on what
occurs at old ages. In contrast to what happens at low life expectancy, ∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
−
∂µ(t,v)
∂e0(t)
for old ages dominates for high life expectancy. It is lower than values
of this expression for younger ages, so that the sign of ∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
− ∂µ(t,v)
∂e0(t)
changes.
4Model life tables are of common use in demography. Ledermann model life tables are
semi-parametric, resulting from regressions performed at each age on some 300 empirical life
tables.
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Figure 1: Value of ∂µ(t,a)
∂e0(t)
with respect to life expectancy. Ledermann model life
tables.
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Subsequently, the sign of
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
changes, too. The shape of the life table is then
determinant in the relationship between longevity and optimal schooling time.
Age
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
e  =300
e  =400
e  =500
e  =600
e  =700
  (60) µ
e0
  (v) µ
e0
- d( )
0
a
a
v
Figure 2: Example of values taken by
∫ a
0 (
∂µ(u)
∂e0
− ∂µ(v)
∂e0
) dv as a function of age a
and with respect to life expectancy e0. Ledermann model life tables.
The sign of ∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
− ∂µ(t,v)
∂e0(t)
is modulated by e−ρ(t)(t)aσ(t, a)φ(t, a) and by
e
−
∫ b
AS(t)
µ(t,u) du
e−ρ(t)(b−AS(t)): we propose to specify the fertility schedule and ex-
amine the relationship between longevity and schooling through their determi-
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nants which are fertility and mortality.
4 Empirical analysis
Our theoretical analysis has shown that the relationship between longevity
and schooling is mediated by the age structure, if the social planner maximizes
collective well-being from the conditions prevailing at the period, which is realis-
tic. The case of nineteenth century France is exemplary because France experi-
enced a century of literacy transition, with the literacy rate rising from 23% on
average in 1806 to 96% in 1906, and a century of demographic transition, with
an average life expectancy rising from 36 years in 1806-10 to 47 years in 1906-10
and a Coale overall fertility index that fell from 0.39 in 1806 to 0.22 in 1906.
France is also a well-documented case (Bonneuil, 1997; Bonneuil and Rosental,
1999, 2008). It allows us to examine the diversity of demographic and literacy
conditions in a historical follow-up, marked by State schooling policies.
4.1 The relationship between schooling and longevity varies
with the demographic transition
Equation (23) shows that
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
depends on the improvement in mortality
at young ages. At the onset of the demographic transition, mortality decreases
faster at young ages than at any other age. This is due, among other reasons, to
the fact that a large proportion of infants and children in the old demographic
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regime died from water-borne diseases, often through dehydration resulting from
diarrhea caused by poor water quality. The mortality decline was triggered by
improvements in hygiene, the cleaning of contaminated reservoirs, the filtering
of water supplies, especially in cities, and the eradication of unsafe health prac-
tices (Bonneuil and Fursa, forthcoming). Perrenoud and Bourdelais (1998) also
point out the diminishing virulence of smallpox in Europe as contributing to the
mortality decline among children, especially in the 2-4 age group. So, when life
expectancy at birth e0 remains under approximately 50 years, the term
∂µ(t,v)
∂e0(t)
at low age v is relatively high, and the term
∫ a
0 (
∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
− ∂µ(t,v)
∂e0(t)
) dv is positive for
most values of u, as Figure 2 shows on Ledermann’s model life tables (which
are built on historical data). Then from Equation (23),
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
< 0 (expected
schooling decreasing with longevity). The major decline in infant mortality rel-
ative to mortality at other ages implies a larger proportion of children surviving
and going to school. Juvenile mortality did not decrease so quickly, however.
The population includes more young children, but not many teenagers, whose
mortality decreased less rapidly. As a consequence, the average total number of
expected schooling years decreases while longevity increases.
Conversely, in the post-transition era, life expectancy at birth e0 is higher,
infant mortality is already low, and mortality at older ages has declined substan-
tially, so that the term
∫ a
0 (
∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
− ∂µ(t,v)
∂e0(t)
) dv is negative for many values of u, as
Figure 2 shows. Then
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
> 0. As a consequence, the average total number
of expected schooling years increases with longevity.
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4.2 Mortality
Mortality studies have shown that mortality is regular with age only over
short periods, say a year, subsequently across different cohorts living at the same
time. Cohort mortality patterns on the contrary look irregular, because a cohort
successively experiences uneven conditions. This is the reason why models of
mortality are meaningful only for fictitious cohorts at a given period, and always
unrealistic for actual cohorts followed-up over time.
In the Appendix, we present two toy cases: constant and linear mortality,
to show that the relationship between longevity and schooling rapidly becomes
complicated. We also present the more realistic case of Gompertz mortality,
because it is a well-known mortality model, realistic only after 40 years of age.
However, as infant mortality plays a major role, only the case of model life tables
is worth considering.
The model life tables we use (Ledermann, 1969) are semi-parametric, indexed
by a single parameter e(t), close to the life expectancy at birth:
log10(1− e−
∫ 5
0
µ(t,a+u) du) = γ1a + γ
2
a log10(100− e(t)) (24)
where γ1a and γ
2
a, a = 0, 5, · · · , 85 were estimated by Ledermann (1969) from
some three hundred empirical life tables. With this semi-parametric formula, we
compute ∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
and ∂ρ(t)
∂e0(t)
numerically.
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4.3 Fertility
We introduced the age structure through the simple stable population model.
The population growth rate ρ(t) then appears in Equations (19) and (20). Rather
than treating this population growth rate as exogenous, we gain better insight
into the demographic processes at work by revealing its dependence on fertility
with respect to Equation (10).
Coale and Trussel (1974) calibrated the semi-parametric model of realistic
five-year fertility schedules:
φ(t, a) = M(t)n(a)em(t)ν(a) (25)
where n(a) and ν(a) are given distributions by age. The parameter M(t) ≥ 0
represents a fertility level, m(t) ≥ 0 conditions the shape of the distribution:
m > 0 reflects family limitation, m = 0 the absence of family limitation. We
obtain the yearly fertility schedule by cubic spline on the cumulated function
∫ a
15 φ(t, u) du.
4.4 Age profile of wages
Statistics of wages by age are scarce. None are mentioned in the impor-
tant book by Chevallier (1887) on wages in nineteenth century France. Only
recent statistics are available, such as those published by Aeberhardt, Pouget,
and Skalitz (2007) for the period 1978-2005: wages earned by men over 45 in-
crease slightly compared to those of younger age classes. This is due mainly to
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the increase over this period in the proportion of highly skilled wage-earners, for
whom wages increase the most with age, whereas the age profile is almost flat
for unskilled and low-skilled workers (Aubert and Cre´pon, 2003). For the year
1978, for men under 30, the ratio of wages to those of men aged over 45 is 0.37
and for men aged 30-45 it is 0.88. The unknown age profiles before the year 1978
should be closer to the uniform distribution, especially before WWII when the
French population was mostly rural. Because ι(b)/ι(AS(t)) ≥ 1 for b > AS(t)
and increases with age b, the age profile ι(.) reduces the weight given by high
mortality to young age classes. Consequently, using the 1978 French age profile
for ι(.) lower bounds the probability that ∂(1/θ′(S(t)))/∂e0(t) is negative, while
using the uniform distribution for ι(.) upper bounds it. For each year between
1978 and 1988, we fit an age profile by yearly age to the three values presented by
Aeberhardt, Pouget, and Skalitz (2007) through a continuous function consisting
of one constant before age 21 (to avoid that the interpolated wage before 21 takes
too low a value) and three linear interpolations from ages 21 to 65 by one-year
interval, with continuity constraints at ages 21, 30, and 45. We then solve a
system of linear equations equating the mean wages obtained by interpolation
to the recorded values and minimizing the variation of the slope over the age
interval 22-65. Table 4.4 presents the resulting 1978 yearly age profile grouped
into five-year classes to save space.
The computation of ∂(1/θ′(S(t)))/∂e0(t) is robust to the age profile ι(.): as
expected, with the uniform distribution, this quantity remains in the negative
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Table 1: Age profile of wages regrouped in five-year age classes
age percent age percent age percent age percent age percent
15-19 0.56 20-24 0.71 25-29 1.43 30-34 2.02 35-39 2.33
40-44 2.65 45-49 2.76 50-54 2.65 55-59 2.55 60-64 2.45
half plane for longer than with the 1978 age profile, but the difference is tiny:
at fixed total fertility rate and shape parameter m, ∂(1/θ′(S(t)))/∂e0(t) under
the uniform distribution for ι(.) crosses the zero line at a life expectancy at birth
which is less than 0.5% on average higher than with the 1978 age profile.
4.5 Results
Figure 3 shows the computation of f(e0(t), φ(t, .)) for Lederman life tables
(with e0(t) varying) and for Coale-Trussel fertility schedules φ(t, .) (with m and
M varying). As we mentioned, both fertility and mortality patterns are both
realistic, and the result no longer comes from a simplifying assumption on these
schedules. The value of the total fertility rate (TFR(t):=
∫ A¯
0 φ(t, a) da) is given
on each (m,M) to help situate the level of fertility.
Figure 3 shows that f(e0(t), φ(t, .)) and subsequently
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
change with
respect to life expectancy and with fertility,
For example, with m ≈ 0 for nineteenth century France (Bonneuil, 1997a),
we situate French de´partements over the course of the demographic transition.
The population of the Calvados de´partement was one of the earliest to embark on
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Figure 3: Value of
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
, varying with life expectancy (Ledermann model life
tables) and Coale-Trusssel fertility, m the parameter of family limitation, and
TFR the total fertility rate. The wage age profile ι(.) is the French one in 1978
presented in Table 1. In this Figure, ρ(t) is always positive.
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fertility decline and experienced an almost stationary fertility during the nine-
teenth century: TFR=3.11 and e0 = 47.5 in 1806; TFR= 2.74, and e0 = 45.8
in 1906 (Bonneuil, 1997a). Calvados then began in the positive half plane of
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
= 0 in Figure 3a to move to negative values. This comes from the fact
that this de´partement started its demographic transition early, with relatively
low mortality and fertility levels, but mortality decreased slightly while fertil-
ity did not decline fast enough, leading Calvados to increase the proportion of
young age classes and to cross the zero line of
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
= 0 in the direction of
negative values. At the other end of the spectrum of the transition, the French
de´partement of Finiste`re, whose population was one of the last to enter the fertil-
ity decline (TFR= 8.09, e0 = 28.7 years in 1806; TFR= 4.11, e0 = 39.5 years in
1906),
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0
remains negative during this period (Figure 3a), although travel-
ing toward positive values, which are attained at the beginning of the twentieth
century. This comes from the fact that these demographic conditions correspond
to a “young” age pyramid, which puts
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0
in the negative half plane of
Figure 3a). The move toward positive values corresponds to the aging process
caused mostly by declining fertility. So, for the same country, at the same epoch,
namely nineteenth-century France, we find locations with positive signs, others
with negative signs.
Figure 4 shows what the direction of the relationship between longevity and
period school life expectancy would have been if a social planner had solved
Equation (1), taking into account the demographic conditions of the moment.
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In nineteenth-century France, even if the relationship between the increase in
schooling rate and in life expectancy is ambivalent at the de´partement level, as
we mentioned in the introduction, the demographic transition at the national
level was accompanied by a series of State policies most often directed toward
increasing schooling for both sexes, finally consistent with the maximization pro-
gram (1).
Between 1830 and 1895, the still young age structure of the French population
should have prompted governments to reduce the length of schooling in order to
maximize well-being. Schooling was still not mandatory and was dominated by
clerics. However, French governments, aware that the country’s future (at the
possible price of optimal well-being) depended upon the people’s literacy, began
to implement policies in favor of schooling: the Guizot law of 1833 required
that villages with at least 500 inhabitants have a boy’s school (e´cole primaire
e´le´mentaire), that higher-level primary schools (e´cole primaire supe´rieure) be
set up for vocational training of poor pupils, and that each de´partement had a
teaching training college for primary school teachers (e´cole normale primaire).
The Falloux law of 1850 required each municipality to open a school for girls,
and the Duruy law of 10 April 1867 provided for the development of girls schools
and for free school access for boys and girls in municipalities (communes) that so
wished.
High schools for girls were created in 1880, but only the wealthiest could access
them at that time. Jules Ferry, minister of Public Education and Arts, addressing
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the President of the Republic on the 25 of January 1880, described the immense
improvement in primary schooling: from 1837 to 1877, he claimed that the total
number of pupils had increased by 82 percent, the total number of schools by
36 percent, (75 percent for secular schools), girls schools had multiplied four-fold
and the total number of teachers had risen by 85 percent, with a pupil-teacher
ratio that had fallen from 53 to 1 to 48 to 1.
From 1896 onward, Figure 4 shows that, except during the two World Wars,
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
becomes definitely positive, while both life expectancy at birth and ex-
pected schooling were increasing. This is corroborated by the Astier law of 1919,
which fostered the development of technical schools. The return of f(e0, φ(.))
during the two World Wars to negative values is attributable to the fall in both
fertility and mortality. In terms of the relationship between longevity and school-
ing, it is also coincided —although certainly by chance— with the introduction
of fees to attend high school by the Vichy regime (1940-44). The high values
of
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
after the war are consistent with the increase in schooling, notably
through the Berthoin reform of 1959, which made schooling mandatory until 16
years of age (although it was not enforced until 1971).
In the problem of the relationship between longevity and schooling, one could
ignore the role played by fertility, because children attending school are of a
certain age. This would be a mistake, as it would mean using a mortality sched-
ule which ignores the specific pattern of infant mortality. The relationship in
fact depends on fertility as well as on mortality, because fertility determines the
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population growth rate and the age structure, which appears as pt(t,a)
pt(t,AS(t))
in Equa-
tion (14) for the general case or through ρ(t) in Equation (23) in the case of the
stable population of the moment.
A very good way to capture the conditions of the moment in a real population
is to fit the stable population associated with the fertility and the mortality
schedules of this moment.5
Figure 4 shows the trajectory of f(e0, φ(.)) for these stable populations asso-
ciated with the conditions of each year between 1806 and 1988 in the whole of
France. The age-specific fertility distribution is known only from 1892 onward
(for the whole of the country). From 1806 to 1892, the age-specific schedule of
1892 is used with the TFR deduced from the Coale fertility index reconstructed
by Bonneuil (1997a). Over the course of France’s demographic transition, which
took place during the nineteenth century, when life expectancy was still low,
f(e0, φ(.)) is negative. With life expectancy increasing, this function becomes
positive, with two abrupt returns to negative values during the World Wars, on
account of the higher wartime mortality.
5Reminder: we never assume that the empirical population is stable; we compute the con-
ditions of the moment t given by Lotka’s intrinsic growth rate ρ(t) (equation (10)) and by the
associated stable population having the mortality and fertility schedules of the moment t. We
do this at each year t between 1806 and 1988. The time series of the conditions of the moment
are reflected by the time series of the associated stable populations
(
(pt(τ, a))τ,a
)
t=t0,···,tf and
the associated intrinsic growth rates (ρ(t))t=t0,···,tf (where the initial date is t0 and the last date
tf ).
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The wage age profile ι(.) is the French one presented in 1978 in Table 1.
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After the effect of declining fertility, we again find the key role played by
infant mortality, which declined continuously (except during crises such as the
1870-71 Franco-Prussian war or the World Wars) between 1806 and 1988. The
zero line was crossed by
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
when the variations of the mortality rate µ
became dominated by the changes at old ages, and specifically in Figure 4, for
period life expectancies over 46 years.
So, from Figures 3 and 4, in the case of θ strictly concave, the Ben-Porath
proposition that schooling grows with longevity appears to be optimal only in
post-transitional countries, and in conditions of sufficiently low mortality and
low fertility. In countries currently experiencing the transition, especially in those
where mortality is still high and fertility not high enough to attain the complete
replacement of the population, the age structure is relevant, and longer life is no
longer associated with schooling in a Ben Porath-like manner.
5 Conclusion
Schooling has been a political process, whereby planners adapted (or not) to
changing conditions. Policies involving demographic forces and favoring collec-
tive well-being over the interests of individual cohorts and the situations inher-
ited from the past should adapt to conditions of the moment. By maximizing
the collective utility associated with the conditions of the moment, we escaped
the premise that individual decision-making governs the relationship between
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longevity and education.
By doing so, we revealed the role played by the age structure in the relation-
ship between longevity and schooling. We showed that optimal period school life
expectancy varies with life expectancy and mortality, and that the direction of
this relationship is negative for young age pyramids, associated with high fertil-
ity and high mortality. The effect of an increase in life expectancy on expected
schooling is thus dependent on the age structure. The realistic case of model
life tables associated with model fertility schedules shows that the relationship
between longevity and schooling depends on both life expectancy and fertility, in
a non linear manner. With varying fertility and mortality, as was the case during
the demographic transition, the direction of this relationship changes. The posi-
tive relationship between longevity and schooling claimed by Ben Porath (1967)
holds true only for ‘ old” enough age pyramids, corresponding to post-transitional
populations. It does not hold true for “young” populations.
Our analysis of French historical data from 1806 to the present has shown
that the population age structure has indeed modified the relationship between
longevity and optimal schooling. The French case shows that governments in the
nineteenth century may not have complied with the objective of maximal well-
being, and may have had higher views of what was good for the country, if not
for the people. The maximization program, however, indicates what should have
been done in order to maximize well-being: the deviation from this program tells
us about the gap between economics and politics.
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The method of the fictitious cohort, fundamental in demography and essential
to understanding how a situation is changing at a given moment, may have
been mistakenly ignored in economics. Our study of the relationship between
longevity and schooling shows that the certainties derived from individual-based
frameworks are overturned when age structure and conditions of the moment are
fully addressed.
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Appendix: constant, linear, and Gompertz mor-
tality
Constant mortality: ∀u, ∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
= k constant From Equation (20),
∂ρ(t)
∂e0(t)
= −k (26)
and from Equation (10):
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)))
∂e0(t)
= 0 , (27)
the increase in life expectancy has no effect on schooling.
In particular, if µ(t, u) = µ, e0(t) =
1
µ
, ∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
= − 1
e0(t)2
is constant with age
and Equation (27) holds true.
Linear mortality: µ(t, x) = Bx The linear case is not realistic, but is of inter-
est here because it is the simplest departure from the case of mortality constant
with age. Then
σ(t, a) = e−
B
2
a2
e0(t) =
∫ A¯
0 σ(t, a) da = (
pi
2B
)
1
2
(28)
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which yields:
∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
= − pi
e0(t)3
u
∂ρ(t)
∂e0(t)
= pi
2e0(t)3
Vm+A2m
Am
(29)
where Am and Vm are the period mean age at procreation and the variance of the
age at procreation:
Am =
∫ A¯
0 ae
−ρ(t)(t)aσ(t, a)φ(t, a) da
Vm = −A2m +
∫ A¯
0 a
2e−ρ(t)(t)aσ(t, a)φ(t, a) da
(30)
Finally:
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
= (1− `(t, AS(t))) pi2e0(t)3∫ AR
AS(t)
(b− AS(t))(b+ AS(t)− Am − VmAm )σ(t, b)
ι(b)
ι(AS(t))
e−ρ(t)(b−AS(t)) db
(31)
Equation (31) shows that for AS(t) high enough,
∂( 1
θ′(S(t)) )
∂e0(t)
> 0, which would
validate the Ben-Porath mechanism. The problem is that the decrease of ∂µ(t,u)
∂e0(t)
with age described in Equation (29) is contrary to real-world experience.
Gompertz mortality The Gompertz law of mortality is a close approximation
of the observed force of mortality after 40 years of age. It relies on two parameters
A for the level and γ for the increase with age:
µ(t, a) = Aγa with γ > 1 and A < 1. (32)
The survival function is then an exponential of an exponential: in no circum-
stances can a simple exponential portray an empirical human survival function.
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Differentiating with respect to life expectancy e0(t) yields:
∂µ(t, u)
∂e0(t)
= (
∂ ln(A)
∂e0(t)
+ u
∂ ln(γ)
∂e0(t)
)µ(t, u) (33)
which is negative because ∂ ln(A)
∂e0(t)
< 0 and ∂ ln(γ)
∂e0(t)
< 0. After integration by parts:
∫ b
0
∂µ(t, u)
∂e0(t)
du =
A
ln γ
(
∂ lnA
∂e0(t)
(γb − 1) + ∂ ln γ
∂e0(t)
(bγb − 1
ln γ
(γb − 1))) (34)
Hence:
∫ b
AS(t)
∂µ(t, u)
∂e0(t)
du =
A
ln γ
(
∂ lnA
∂e0(t)
(γb−γAS(t))+ ∂ ln γ
∂e0(t)
(bγb−AS(t)γAS(t)− 1
ln γ
(γb−γAS(t))))
(35)
and
∂ρ(t)
∂e0(t)
=
1
Am
A
ln γ
∫ A¯
0
(
∂ lnA
∂e0(t)
(1−γa)− ∂ ln γ
∂e0(t)
(aγa− 1
ln γ
(γa−1)))σ(t, a)φ(t, a)e−ρ(t)a da
(36)
with again Am =
∫ A¯
0 ae
−ρ(t)aσ(t, a)φ(t, a) da. Equations (35) and (36) introduced
into Equation (19) yield a computable formula. It remains however hard to inter-
pret because the relationship of A and γ as functions of e0 are not straightforward.
This is better to work with model life tables, which are obtained from empirical
data, and for which there is no need to compute which values of the parameters
correspond to a given life expectancy. The difficulty arises because Gompertz,
although good at describing mortality after 40 years of age, gives a poor fit before
that age, especially at infant and juvenile ages.
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